2024-03-28T16:33:39Z
http://eprints.biblio.unitn.it/cgi/oai2
oai:eprints.biblio.unitn.it:389
2012-02-28T14:16:25Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D51:5141:5141323639
7375626A656374733D48:4842:4842313331
74797065733D61727469636C656A6F75726E616C
Adaptive learning and emergent coordination in minority games
Bottazzi, Giulio
Devetag, Giovanna
Dosi, Giovanni
QA269 Game theory
HB131 Methodology
The work studies the properties of a coordination game in which agents repeatedly compete to be in the population minority. The game re ects some essential features of those economic situations in which positive rewards are assigned to individuals who behave in opposition to the modal behavior in a population. Here we model a group of heterogeneous agents who adaptively learn and we investigate the transient and long-run aggregate properties of the system in terms of both allocative and informational efficiency. Our results show that, first, the system long-run properties strongly depend on the behavioral learning rules adopted, and, second, adding noise at the individual decision level and hence increasing heterogeneity in the population substantially improve aggregate welfare, although at the expense of a longer adjustment phase. In fact, the system achieves in that way a higher level of efficiency compared to that attainable by perfectly rational and completely informed agents.
Università degli Studi di Trento
2001-01
Article in journal
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://eprints.biblio.unitn.it/389/1/BDD_alec.pdf
Bottazzi, Giulio and Devetag, Giovanna and Dosi, Giovanni (2001) Adaptive learning and emergent coordination in minority games. In «ROCK Working Papers», Università degli Studi di Trento. (Unpublished)
http://eprints.biblio.unitn.it/389/
oai:eprints.biblio.unitn.it:391
2012-02-28T14:16:27Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D51:5141:5141323639
7375626A656374733D48:4842:4842313331
74797065733D61727469636C656A6F75726E616C
An experimental investigation of fairness and reciprocal behavior in a triangular principal-multiagent relationship
Rossi, Alessandro
Warglien, Massimo
QA269 Game theory
HB131 Methodology
Issues of fairness in hierarchies have been mostly investigated - both theoretically and experimentally - within dyadic principle-agent relationships. In this paper we consider triangular principal-multiagents structures, integrating vertical hierarchical relationships with horizontal agent-to-agent ones. We explore in the laboratory a game that allows to investigate how principal's fairness affects cooperation between two interdependent agents performing a simple production task. Our experimental findings show that perceived fairness of principal's actions may trigger reciprocation in agent's behavior, affecting how agents play the production game.
Università degli Studi di Trento
2001-06
Article in journal
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://eprints.biblio.unitn.it/391/1/RW_inv.pdf
Rossi, Alessandro and Warglien, Massimo (2001) An experimental investigation of fairness and reciprocal behavior in a triangular principal-multiagent relationship. In «ROCK Working Papers», Università degli Studi di Trento. (Unpublished)
http://eprints.biblio.unitn.it/391/
oai:eprints.biblio.unitn.it:488
2012-02-28T14:16:51Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D48:4842:4842313335
7375626A656374733D48:4842:4842313331
74797065733D746563687265706F7274
Essays on Computable Economics, Methodology and the Philosophy of Science
Velupillai, Kumaraswamy
HB131 Methodology
HB135 Mathematical economics. Quantitative methods
These essays tackle standard problems in mathematical economics, macroeconomics, methodology and a particular aspect of Popperian Philosophy of Science from the point of view of classical recursion theory and constructive mathematics.
2003
Departmental Technical Report
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://eprints.biblio.unitn.it/488/1/Computable_Essays_14%2D11%2D03.pdf
Velupillai, Kumaraswamy (2003) Essays on Computable Economics, Methodology and the Philosophy of Science. UNSPECIFIED. (Unpublished)
http://eprints.biblio.unitn.it/488/
oai:eprints.biblio.unitn.it:1298
2015-02-02T10:52:38Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D48:4842:4842313331
74797065733D746563687265706F7274
A framework for cut-off sampling in business survey design
Bee, Marco
Benedetti, Roberto
Espa, Giuseppe
HB131 Methodology
In sampling theory the large concentration of the population with respect to most surveyed variables constitutes a problem which is difficult to tackle by means of classical tools. One possible solution is given by cut-off sampling, which explicitly prescribes to discard part of the population; in particular, if the population is composed by firms or establishments, the method results in the exclusion of the “smallest” firms. Whereas this sampling scheme is common among practitioners, its theoretical foundations tend to be considered weak, because the inclusion probability of some units is equal to zero. In this paper we propose a framework to justify cut-off sampling and to determine the census and cut-off thresholds. We use an estimation model which assumes as known the weight of the discarded units with respect to each variable; we compute the variance of the estimator and its bias, which is caused by violations of the aforementioned hypothesis. We develop an algorithm which minimizes the MSE as a function of multivariate auxiliary information at the population level. Considering the combinatorial optimization nature of the model, we resort to the theory of stochastic relaxation: in particular, we use the simulated annealing algorithm.
2007
Departmental Technical Report
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://eprints.biblio.unitn.it/1298/1/9_07_bee.pdf
Bee, Marco and Benedetti, Roberto and Espa, Giuseppe (2007) A framework for cut-off sampling in business survey design. UNSPECIFIED.
http://eprints.biblio.unitn.it/1298/
oai:eprints.biblio.unitn.it:1310
2012-02-28T14:20:43Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D48:4842:4842313331
74797065733D746563687265706F7274
The sustainable enterprise: the multi-fiduciary perspective to the EU sustainability strategy
Danese, Giuseppe
HB131 Methodology
This essay deals with two issues. First, it tries to delineate, via the concept of enlarged fiduciary proviso, the contribution of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) to the implementation of the EU Sustainability Strategy. The primary aim of the European institutions in delineating such strategy was to promote a concern for the environment, interpreted here as a proxy for the welfare of future generations of stakeholders. Progresses towards sustainable development can be made if we interpret CSR as a governance framework that extends fiduciary protection from a mono-takeholder perspective, in which the sole relevant constituency for the design of corporate policy is the shareholders’, to a multi-stakeholder perspective, in which legitimate claims are held by a variety of constituencies, possibly operating at different times. Secondly, the essay tries to establish an organic link between the concept of sustainability and a Social Contract account of the business enterprise. The Social Contract of the stakeholders, an ideal reference point for corporate policy-makers, is formed behind a veil of ignorance, resulting in an agreement that is both impartial and nonhistorical.
2007
Departmental Technical Report
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://eprints.biblio.unitn.it/1310/1/21_07_danese.pdf
Danese, Giuseppe (2007) The sustainable enterprise: the multi-fiduciary perspective to the EU sustainability strategy. UNSPECIFIED.
http://eprints.biblio.unitn.it/1310/
oai:eprints.biblio.unitn.it:1909
2015-02-11T08:58:37Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D48:4842:4842313331
74797065733D746563687265706F7274
Feature-based Choice and Similarity in Normal-form Games: An Experimental Study
Devetag, Giovanna
Di Guida, Sibilla
HB131 Methodology
In this paper we test the effect of descriptive "features" on initial strategic behavior in normal form games, where "descriptive" are all those features that can be modified without altering the (Nash) equilibrium structure of a game. We observe that our experimental subjects behave according to some simple heuristics based on descriptive features, and that these heuristics are stable even across strategically different games. This suggests that a categorization of games based on features may be more accurate in predicting agents' initial behavior than the standard categorization based on Nash equilibria, as shown by the analysis of individual behavior. Analysis of choice patterns and individual response times suggests that non-equilibrium choices may be due to the use of incorrect and simplified mental representations of the game structure, rather than to beliefs in other players' irrationality. Of the four stationary concepts analyzed (Nash equilibrium, QRE, action sampling, and payoff sampling), QRE results the best in fitting the data.
Università degli Studi di Trento
2010-11
Departmental Technical Report
PeerReviewed
application/pdf
http://eprints.biblio.unitn.it/1909/1/07.pdf
http://www.unitn.it/disa/10528/working-papers-anno-2010
Devetag, Giovanna and Di Guida, Sibilla (2010) Feature-based Choice and Similarity in Normal-form Games: An Experimental Study. DISA Working Paper; 7 . Trento : Università degli Studi di Trento.
http://eprints.biblio.unitn.it/1909/