Coordination and self-organization in minority games: experimental evidence

Bottazzi, Giulio and Devetag, Giovanna (2002) Coordination and self-organization in minority games: experimental evidence. UNSPECIFIED. (Unpublished)

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    This work presents experimental results on a coordination game in which agents must repeatidly choose between two sides, and a positive fixed payoff is assigned only to agents who pick the minoritarian side. We conduct laboratory experiments in which stationary groups of five players play the game for 100 periods, and manipulate two treatment variables: the amount of 'memory' M that players have regarding the game history (i.e. , the length of the string of past outcomes that players can see on the screen while choosing), and the amount of information about other players' past choices. Our results show that, at the aggregate level, a quite remarkable degree of coordination is achieved. Moreover providing players with full information about other players' choice distribution does not appear to improve efficiency significantly. At the individual level, a substantial portion of subjects exhibit 'inertal' behavior.

    Item Type: Departmental Technical Report
    Department or Research center: CEEL (Computable and Experimental Economics Laboratory)
    Subjects: Q Science > QA Mathematics > QA269 Game theory
    H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
    Report Number: 15
    Repository staff approval on: 19 Jan 2011

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