Precedent transfer in coordination games: experimental evidence

Devetag, Giovanna (2002) Precedent transfer in coordination games: experimental evidence. UNSPECIFIED. (Unpublished)

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    In this work we study the power of precedent transfer in improving coordination in the minimum effort game with large groups. We test whether groups which play a different coordination game in which chances to reach the best equilibrium are higher than in the minimum effort game can then transfer the homegrown precedent of e±ciency to the minimum e®ort game, achieving better coordination results compared to baseline treatments. We also test whether the opposite holds, i.e., whether ine±cient precedents achieved by groups in the minimum effort game negatively a®ect the subsequent probability of reaching the e±cient equilibrium in similar games. Our results show that e±cient precedents are generally transferred successfully to the minimum effort game, allowing groups to achieve better equilibrium outcomes compared to standard results.

    Item Type: Departmental Technical Report
    Department or Research center: CEEL (Computable and Experimental Economics Laboratory)
    Subjects: Q Science > QA Mathematics > QA269 Game theory
    H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
    Uncontrolled Keywords: critical mass games - minimum effort games - coordination equilibrium selection - precedent transfer - trust
    Report Number: 7
    Repository staff approval on: 18 Jan 2011

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