MIGRANTS AS THE REAL EUROPEANS

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We, the Europeans. Yet, most of us – what we may call ‘mainstream society’ – are, in fact, in the first place nationals of member states who have inherited the European citizenship by virtue of our first-degree membership⁷. It is a well-known dilemma that the legacy of the nation-state is a mixed blessing in the construction of Europe: up to a certain point, nation-states have been the leading force in this enterprise, but the more the construction progresses, the more they tend to act as an obstacle along the path (see e.g. Kriesi et al., eds, 1999). This has clearly been the case of the European constitutional experience so far, as a single institutional framework has proved incapable of accommodating the integration process (Stráth, ed, 2000; Wilkinson 2003; Bermann 2004; Delanty and Rumford 2005; Majone 2005; Wagner 2005; Blokker 2007). Politicians such as Joschka Fischer (2000),

⁷ A shorter version of this paper was originally presented at the Oñati International Institute for the Sociology of Law European Ways of Law Conference, Oñati, July 6–8, 2005. I wish to thank all the people who commented on the paper and with whom I have been carrying on fruitful conversations on these topics: Ivan Pupolizio, Giuseppe Campesi, Giovanni Ceriani, Iker Barbero, Libardo Ariza, Alex Bosco, Mihaela Vancea and Robert Leckey. I am likewise thankful to one anonymous reviewer. I have benefited from insights by Roderick A. Macdonald while organizing with him the Migrant Pluralism and the Mobility of Law Seminar at the Pierre Eliot Trudeau Foundation, Montreal, November 20, 2004. Finally, I am grateful to Boaventura de Sousa Santos for intellectual inspiration. andrea.brighenti@soc.unimi.it, www.bung.it

⁸The argument has been advanced, among others, by Jürgen Habermas (2001). The Treaty of Nice (consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, TEU) declares in the Preamble that the contracting parties resolved “to establish a citizenship common to nationals of their countries”. Since the contracting parties are nation-states, European citizenship is clearly framed as a continuation of national citizenship.

⁹ Consider for instance the following remark by George Bermann: “When nations embark on a stated programme of ever greater closer integration, while leaving over—an ongoing basis—the decision of whether, when, how, and subject to what specific conditions and reservations to travel down that road, and how fast or linearly to do so, the constitution-making that occurs will be highly untidy and the product at any given time will look highly unfinished. This is all the more so when the only thing that has been predetermined is that these states will in principle continue to deliberate among themselves (and with other partner states they might pick up along the way), when each amendment have to have been the product of the untidy political bargaining that strongly typifies intergovernmental decision-making, and when, by way of innovation under the new draft constitution, all States know that their partners have the express right to withdraw if they should ever become sufficiently disenchanted or come to look upon the EU as a sufficiently bad bargain.”
Lionel Jospin (2001) and Romano Prodi (2000) have, in different veins, advanced proposals for a path to Europe based on a federalist recipe, in other words a European state-like construction. Thus, since the outset, European citizenship seems to suffer, in its ambition towards the accommodation of diversity, of the inheritance of the national model.

Contemporary migrants are in a very different condition from the average European citizen. They have the potentiality of becoming directly Europeans. Insofar as they are free from former European national attachments, migrants are, we may say, fitter for Europe than the ‘natives’ themselves. And it is so in spite of the fact that they and their migratory trajectories are tied to capitalist economy and its requirements (Sassen 1988; Massey et al. 1998; Arango 2000; Castles and Miller 2003). As Dario Melossi (2005: 14) argues, “migrants, who still are, in this respect, those ‘free’ and ‘unattached’ workers of which Marx wrote in the first volume of Capital, in the section about ‘primitive accumulation’ – obliged by international socio-economic and political events to be ‘free’ now not only of any property but even of any ‘national’ attachment, free of selling their labour wherever, in the globe, there is a demand for it – would at times seem to be, exactly for this reason, fitter for the new European construction than the natives themselves. They would be better able to assume the ‘universalist’ standpoint of which George Herbert Mead wrote, to personify – were they to be treated like ‘persons’ – the standpoint of ‘European citizens’, who ‘belong’ in a ‘European entity’.”

Thus, one pivotal point is to understand what the ‘nativity’ qualification amounts to in practice. In fact, to the extent that we continue to conceive European citizenship merely or mostly as a continuation and extension of national citizenship, we strengthen its exclusionist attitude, not only towards newcomers, but also towards settled minorities and all those social actors that are perceived or represented as ‘out-of-place’ in the nation-state legal framework. Whereas leading intellectuals such as Edgard Morin (1987) and Jacques Derrida (1992) conceptualized Europe and its culture in terms of ‘tourbillon dialogique’ and ‘différence avec soi’, and advanced a passionate praise of diversity, the cleavage between settled and unsettled people (Simmel 1908), between placed and displaced, between two

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1 Pierre Bourdieu has noticed the powerful consequences of the subtle interplay of implicit normative orders and spatial aspects of social relationships: “Sous peine de s’y sentir déplacés, ceux qui pénètrent dans un espace doivent remplir les conditions qu’il exige tacitement de ses occupants” (Bourdieu 1993: 260).

2 The distinction is of course a much older one. Suffices to say that it is already present in 14th century Tunisian philosopher Ibn Khaldûn, who distinguished social organization of nomadic (al-ʿumrān al-badawi) and sedentary societies (al-ʿumrān al-haḍari). See Alatas (2006).
fundamentally different constructions in the relationship to national space still constitutes the building stone and the legal definiens of European belonging.

Rather than being empowered by the European perspective, migrants’ status is thus weakened and kept weak by the fact that they are now excluded at a higher level than the national one. Exclusion becomes double exclusion. In today’s Europe migrants live in a condition of Limbo, legally, politically and socially speaking. The production of new helots (Cohen 1987) makes the European project contradictory, if not impossible. As Balibar (2001: 31, my translation) argues “If [Europe] continues to avoid serious self-confrontation, it will continue to regard its own problems as an external obstacle that can be faced through external means, such as new colonial forms. In other words, it imposes insurmountable internal barriers that prevent access to citizenship to part of its own population, confining them endlessly into the condition of metics, reproducing in this way its own impossibility”. While it is not the ambition of this paper being conclusive on the point, it is plain that there is the serious risk of reproducing the national form at the European level in a way that emphasizes its regulative and repressive traits only to the detriment of emancipative and empowering traits.

Those who are neutrally defined as ‘third country nationals’ in the Treaty of Amsterdam and in the Treaty of Nice, actually find themselves in a condition of rights deprivation and inferiorization, which is aberrant - this is precisely the meaning of the impossibility of Europe stressed by Balibar - according to the criterion of the very legal tradition that ‘we Europeans’ claim to represent. Jurists

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1 Interestingly, the stranger is described by Simmel in the first place not as a psycho-social type, but rather as a form of social relationship. Such relational form is fully territorial and it recalls not by chance Bourdieu’s problem of placedness and out-of-placedness (see supra, note 3): “The stranger is thus being discussed here, not in the sense often touched upon in the past, as the wanderer who comes today and goes tomorrow, but rather as the person who comes today and stays to morrow. He is, so to speak, the potential wanderer: although he has not moved on, he has not quite overcome the freedom of coming and going; He is fixed within a particular spatial group, or within a group whose boundaries are similar to spatial boundaries. But his position in this group is determined, essentially, by the fact that he has not belonged to it from the beginning, that he imports qualities into it, which do not and cannot stem from the group itself.” (Simmel 1908: 402). On territory as social relationship, see Brighenti (2006).

1 Santos (1995: 2) understands regulation and emancipation as the two founding pillars of Western legal culture: “The pillar of regulation is constituted by the principle of the state, formulated most prominently by Hobbes, the principle of the market, developed by Locke and Adam Smith in particular, and the principle of the community, which presides over Rousseau’s social and political theory [...] The pillar of emancipation is constituted by three logics of rationality as identified by Weber: the aesthetic-expressive rationality of the arts and literature, the cognitive-instrumental rationality of science and technology, the moral-practical rationality of ethics and the rule of law”. The great promise of modern law is thus configured as an exercise of regulation in the name of emancipation.

1 Since the creation of the European Community, the main forum for the discussion of common measure on immigration has been inter-governmental. Harmonization of European immigration and asylum policy has been developing for long as a second order concern and, up to a point, as a
have argued that the Treaty of Amsterdam has created a uniform legal basis for measures on immigration, because under the provisions of the new Title IV each asylum application is supposed to be adjudicated on the basis of equivalent procedures and largely uniform criteria throughout Europe. But the image of a progressive and linear harmonization of regulation within the European Union is misleading. In fact, contradictions and quick policy variations thrive, as European policies on migration mirror the same problems of European policies in many other fields. A permanent tension endures between the glorification of European level decisions, and between the declaration of the necessity of facing the problem at the European level vis à vis the persistence of diverging interests and consequent temptation to resort to free rider tactics.

So far, efforts to harmonize migration policy at the European level have achieved results only the field of common asylum policy and in recurrent zero-tolerance declarations against illegal immigration. “The history of immigration policy, -Ian Ward (2002: 229) realistically observes - both within the nation-states of Europe and in the Union is unedifying. When cheap labour was needed, Europe could not get enough immigrants. Now that cheap labour is not so desirable, Europe has established a whole series of rules and regulations by which to marginalize received immigrants and discourage aspiring immigrants”. Some specialists have ventured to write about the necessity of eliminating ‘asylum shopping’. In response, other scholars have evoked the image of the constituting of ‘fortress Europe’”. With an estimated half a million of illegal immigrants per year, one might deduce that Europe is all but a fortress. But it must also be considered that ineffective or semi-effective control on entrance possibilities has been more and more coupled with strict, severe, not to say unfair, control on legal status through means such as inner visa policies, targeting, arbitrary checking, deportation, and naturalization procedures. Europe resembles a fortress, indeed, but one without external walls, or where internal walls are much more serious than the external ones. Citizenship has

by-product of the main economic aim to establish a common market (see Guild and Harlow eds. 2001). The Treaty of Amsterdam has transferred into Community competence areas such as asylum law, immigration policy, visa policy, external frontier regulations as well as repatriation policy. Provisions governing responsibility under the Dublin Convention determine that only one single Member State is responsible for examining an application for asylum lodged in the territory of the Member States. It is understood, in other words, that the asylum procedures in the Member States are based on common legal standards, so that mutual confidence can be enhanced by the communitisation of asylum legislation.

¹ One of the main forces that push in the latter direction is linked to the well known problem of European Union’s ‘legitimacy deficit’. For a recent review, see Follersdal (2006).

² For a passionate criticism of closure-oriented European policies, see Kostakopoulou (2001). Kostakopoulou (2002) forcefully argues for policies granting equal membership and full political inclusion to settled migrants. A recent speech by Jürgen Habermas (2006) also provides arguments in favor of “opening up fortress Europe”: “[A] common European identity will develop all the quicker, the better the dense fabric of national culture in the respective states can integrate citizens of other ethnic or religious origins. Integration is not a one-way street. When it is successful, it can inspire strong national cultures to become more porous, more sensitive and more receptive both domestically and abroad”.  

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become the real fortress, and migrants, *qua* non-citizens, are in constant search for a legal status. The fortress of citizenship has created an ‘armoured citizenship’. Walls are built and drawn not only and so much around physical borders, but around legal territorialities and legal status. Despite the claims of universalist liberal political philosophy, a hierarchy of citizenship is established, which spans from precarious aliens to denizens, to proper citizens.

It is sufficient to consider the extent to which neo-penalism, securitarism and criminalization mechanisms lead to a systematic confusion of administrative and judiciary power in the treatment of ‘third country nationals’ (Wacquant 1999, 2006; Campesi 2003; De Giorgi 2006; §5). Critical researchers have observed that socio-legal mechanisms in place in control agencies breed self-fulfilling prophecies:

“Thus it is that, throughout Europe, police, judicial, and penal practices converge at least in that they are applied with special diligence and severity to persons of non-European phenotype, who are easily spotted and made to bend to the police and juridical arbitrary [sic], to the point that one may speak of a veritable process of criminalization of immigrants that tends, by its destructuring and criminogenic effects, to (co)produce the very phenomenon it is supposed to combat, in accord with the well-known mechanism of the ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ (Merton, 1968). Its main impact is indeed to push its target populations deeper into clandestinity and illegality, and to encourage the durable structuring of specific networks of sociability and mutual help as well as of a parallel economy that escapes all state regulation, a result that is evidently well suited to justify in return the special attention given to these groups by the police services” (Wacquant 1999: 219).

It is because, philosophically speaking, the other is an epiphenomenon of the same that ‘Europe’s others’ (Fitzpatrick and Bergeron eds. 1998) become Europe’s ‘critical beings’ (Fitzpatrick and Tuitt eds. 2004), or *hominès sacrés* (Agamben 1995; Rajaram and Grundy-Warr 2004). The ‘critical’ location of the migrant is due to the fact that it challenges the simple opposition of inclusion and exclusion. The migrant is the included by its own exclusion, or, symmetrically, the excluded through inclusion. It is not as paradoxical as it may seem at first sight, if we just trace back to Pascal’s conception of the ‘mystical foundation of authority’, which has been discussed extensively by contemporary philosophers of law such as Derrida, Cacciari, Bourdieu, Agamben, and Fitzpatrick. Besides that, migrants’ limbo-like condition seems to pass unperceived by the majority of the population, by mainstream, normal society”, which is not directly affected by most measures specifically tailored for migrants, neither is it recorded by the mass media, where the reassuring chant of human rights is endlessly told and re-told. These phenomena direct our attention to look at how visibility and invisibility (Brighenti 2007) effectively shape social processes. Below the lower threshold of fair visibility,

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“ Here the criterion of normalcy should be understood in a Foucauldian vein. See for instance Foucault (1973). From this perspective, the power of the norm is intrinsically linked to its invisibility, i.e. to its capacity to infiltrate the law while, at the same time, operating ‘immanently’ rather than ‘trascendentally’, from ‘within’ rather than from ‘without’.
persons are socially excluded, due to lack of recognition. But also above the upper threshold of fair visibility persons may end up being excluded, due to supra-
visibility and its paralysing effect. It is likewise striking that, for a sector of European mainstream society, which is increasingly abstentionist and ‘pissed-off’ with politics, as well as increasingly indifferent to social movements, and even at times hostile towards them, political rights and the right to resist oppression have since long lost any clearly recognizable meaning. Paradoxically, in the field of political participation migrants are forced to live in a political condition in which many Europeans live simply de facto.

In the mid-Nineties, Brubaker (1995) argued that, in spite of the import of contemporary migratory movement, our age was not one of true mixing, but rather one of ‘unmixing of peoples’. Yet, as hinted above, inclusion and exclusion do not form a clear-cut binary dichotomy. A number of categories of progressive and selective inclusion, and complementary degrees of exclusion, are being established, which resemble – probably not by chance – the multiplication of labour conditions in contemporary economy (see e.g. Bauman 1998; Bourdieu 1999; Castel 2003). Each step of exclusion is created by a boundary, which can be geographic, legal, political, or economic. European space is affected by a multiplication of such boundaries. It is not merely a matter of quantitative increase. New types of boundaries are being introduced and applied through new diagrams of control (Deleuze 1990). Alongside with more traditional spatial boundaries, new virtual boundaries make their appearance. Virtual boundaries are in fact real boundaries which actualize themselves ad personam. Surveillance studies provide plenty of examples of these phenomena (Lyon 2003). Not only visual surveillance, but also data-tracking is an effective boundary-making device. The assemblage of these techniques – truly ‘governmental’ in a Foucauldian sense – suggests that today’s Europe is being transformed into a “surveillance society” (Lyon 2006). Boundaries are employed as one of the main tools for categorical differentiation, personal selection, and social sorting of people. There is a critical threshold in the number of these overlapping boundaries which puts the ‘right to politics’ – understood as deriving from Hannah Arendt’s ‘right to have rights’ – at risk.

Consider for instance the failure of the popular referenda to ratify the European Constitution in France and the Netherlands, whose lesson is still to be entirely to be learned. The failure of referenda raises inter alia the old, painful problem of the elitist nature of the European problem. See for instance the case of the Irish National Forum on Europe, created in the wake of the rejection of the Nice Treaty by Irish electorate (O’Brien 2004).

I would just like to recall that police brutalities in Genova 2001 would have been impossible without a majority of the public opinion that was indifferent or hostile towards social movements. Activist Groups such as Peacelink (http://italy.peacelink.org), Indymedia (http://italy.indymedia.org) and Carmilla (http://www.carmillaonline.com) made an extensive coverage of the facts and subsequent political debate, but their strongly outraged reaction is by itself a symptom of the narcosis of the Italian public opinion, whose interest for the event was in the end only a short-term, sensationalistic one.
Allow me for an instant to go back to the phrase ‘mainstream society’ introduced at the beginning of this paper. For the ‘mainstream’ is precisely located at the interplay - in a ‘zone of indistinction’, we may say - in between the political and the socio-cultural. The decoupling of culture from politics in order to build a common political framework even in the absence of a common cultural framework, is, as well known, at the core of Habermas’ project for European constitutionalism. In an interesting critique of the possibilities and limitations of Habermasian constitutional patriotism theory, Blokker (2007: 9) observes: “[t]he universalist vision of constitutional consensus, which seeks to transcend the ambivalent features of nationalisms and collectivism, fits clearly very well with one of the main rationales of European integration, in which Europe is a primary means of overcoming the horrors of the nationalisms of the World Wars. Habermas’s idea of constitutional patriotism is, however, not without problems and seems to be too limited exactly in the fields of cultural diversity and political conflict over values”14. If in many European countries political pluralism has been transformed into a de facto duality of alternating governments’ coalitions, socio-cultural pluralism in Europe seems to made of one strong, unchallenged majority vis-à-vis a number of under-represented minorities15. Accordingly, in the field of socio-cultural pluralism we face, almost by definition, a constant risk of Tocquevillian ‘tyranny of the majority’ - with the theoretical caveat that majority and minority are never simply quantitate data, but always entail qualitative attitudes. Minority is the minoritarian (Deleuze and Guattari 1975), the hybrid.

The plurality of European legal sources and identity is increasingly recognized by sociologists, political scientists, historians and jurists. It is sometimes claimed that such plurality is both inner, due to the number of traditions generated within Europe, and outer, due to the cultural identities and civilizations with which Europe has been in touch. For instance, Kohli (2000:131) has argued that “[t]he obvious carrier groups of mixed or hybrid identities on the European level are those with conflicting or fuzzy territorial attachments: border populations, international migrants, people in diaspora situations, those with multiple citizenship, or those in multinational or multi-ethnic marriages”. Ultimately, however, inner and outer plurality can never be thoroughly separated. To have it with Julia Kristeva (1993: 21), “I am convinced that, in the long run, only a thorough investigation of our remarkable relationship both with the other and strangeness within ourselves can lead people to give up hunting for the scapegoat outside their group.”

14 The literature on European nationalisms is of course huge. Here I would just like to refer the reader to a recent anthropological take on neo-nationalism in Europe based on the Austrian example: see Gingrich (2006).

15 Under-representation of minorities can be understood as both a political matter of voice (Hirschmann 1970) and a social matter of invisibility and supra-visibility.
ANDREA BRIGHENTI

Consider the example of Islam. For centuries Islam has been constructed as the ‘Other’ to Europe, as in the case of the discourse of orientalism (Said 1978). Today, the development of a Euro-Islam (see e.g. Babes 1997; Rath et al. 2001; Yazbeck-Haddad ed. 2002; Cesari and McLoughlin eds. 2005) provides plenty of examples of *heterogenesis*, a type of diversity creation that is inner and outer at the same time. But the most interesting cases, to my mind, are not those where major cultural paradigms entertain a dialogue, or even mix together. Rather, it is at the *periphery* of paradigms, cultures, civilizations that we find the most powerful heterogenic forms. Heterogenesis does neither follow, nor plainly reproduce, the fault-lines of traditional cultural paradigms. Quite the contrary, it challenges them. *Beur hip hop* is the sort of phenomena I have in mind. Unfortunately, sociological research on similar heterogenetical practices is still largely underdeveloped in Europe, but one can look at examples in the rich American ethnographic tradition (e.g. Sánchez-Jankowski 1991; Bourgois 1993; Anderson 1999). Arguably, more research on molecular heterogenetical practices of diversity, in addition to current research on major socio-cultural paradigms and their interplay (such eventually precipitate into conceptual sandbanks, as is the case of debates on issues like religious symbols in schools), would be beneficial to the European sociological research agenda.

Heterogenetical ways of forging new relations among people can be described through the lenses of *kaleidoscopic federalism*. Following Macdonald (2005: 278), “[k]aleidoscopic federalism is a federalism that focuses more on the actual deployment of social and political power, than on abstract questions of who might, in theory, possess it. Why kaleidoscopic? Because a kaleidoscope of continuously shifting shapes and colours, juxtapositions and patterns reminds us that processes, structures and institutions in law are also in constant flux. Within each of several dimensions there will be dynamic distributions of agency and authority. We can no more know just how jurisdictional attributions will play out in advance, than we can know what jurisdictions will be in issue. We can no more know which relationships will be privileged than we can know who will be privileged within these relationships.”

Heterogenesis and kaleidoscopic federalism bring agency and aspirations of actors to the foreground. They are two concepts that help seeing that the migrant condition is not just a matter of externally attributed, formal status. “Much early migration research predicted that migrants would sever their homeland attachments as they became integrated into the countries that received them. In the last decade, however, many scholars have come to acknowledge that international migration can no longer be seen as a one way process. Events, communities of origin and destination, and lives, most now recognize, are increasingly linked across borders” (Levitt 2001: 4).

We can contextualise this point recalling the difference between internal European migration and contemporary international migration. Internal movement of labour force within Europe has always been below expectations. Italian and Portuguese
form the largest internal migrant groups, but their migration took place mostly in aftermath of World War II. Contemporary ‘third-country’ migrants, on the other hand, actively shape family and solidarity networks that span distant places all over Europe. This phenomenon has been explored by the growing literature on transnational migration (for an introduction, see Basch, Glick Schiller and Blanc-Szanton 1994; Vertovec and Cohen 1999; Levitt 2001; Portes 1996, 2001). Transnational migration tackles a pattern of mobility where flows of people, goods and knowledge are not simply one-way and do not simply tend toward progressive stabilization. Rather, in transnational migration, communities of origin and destination are linked across distance and across time in several directions at once. On-going, strong relationships between place of origin and place of destination allow transnational migrants to develop new forms of economic and cultural adaptation to the receiving society that are based on the resources provided by their transnational communities. Translocal practices give birth to transnational social spaces that span different countries and connect not so much abstract spaces, such as those of the nation-states, but a set of local places with their specific social features. This is why I prefer the concept of ‘translocalism’ to that of ‘transnationalism’.

Translocal migrant lives is fully a European form of living, as it is able to connect different local places within a single meaningful social territory. To give you an example, my neighbour Mustapha is originally from Djerba (Tunisia); he has been living in France and The Netherland, in at least 4 different cities; he speaks 3 European languages and has relatives in more places in Europe than I have heard about. Translocalism is a practice that is at least so widespread as it is undertheorized and under-researched, especially in comparison to the huge amount of literature focused on the national ‘integration of immigrants’”. Translocalism avoids the pitfalls of both reactionary localism advertised by populist, racist and nativist parties and elitist delocalization praised by the Kantian universalism of Eurospex as well as by capitalist forces. It is only looking at everyday law (Macdonald 2002) that we can appreciate actually existing multiplicity and heterogeneity of the legal, as well as its molecular heterogenetic qualities, such as those generated by translocalism. Legal pluralism – coherently and radically understood – is not primarily a matter of parallel coexistence of parallel legal systems within society, but a matter of the complex process through which people make and tell to each other their relationships within a field of constant tension, in between the two dimensions of the explicit and the implicit (see also Macdonald 2006).

In parallel to the multiplication of boundaries, a concurrent multiplication of territories is taking place. New territories largely outnumber canonical ones and give birth to new trans-local territories where new legal interactions occur (see Brighenti 2006). But these territories are not intuitive and not even easy to notice

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* I have developed a critique of the integrationist paradigm at length in Brighenti (2004).
with the observational equipment of classic sociological concepts. Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller (2003: 576) have recently defined as ‘methodological nationalism’ “the naturalization of the nation-state by the social sciences”. They argue that “[s]cholars who share this intellectual orientation [i.e., methodological nationalism] assume that countries are the natural units for comparative studies, equate society with the nation-state, and conflate national interests with the purposes of social science. Methodological nationalism reflects and reinforces the identification that many scholars maintain with their own nation-states”. Because of built-in methodological nationalism, the social sciences find it difficult to recognize the existence of territories other than the canonical national ones. Resistance against uncoupling society and nation is thus not only political, but also, and maybe primarily, epistemological. In fact, methodological nationalism hampers our capability to observe, describe and interpret territorial social phenomena that are not nation-like and that, as such, disconfirm our assumptions about the relationship between people, citizenship, and places inside the nascent European polity.

Admittedly, the European Union project is the historical end-point of the confluence between Weberian state bureaucracies and liberal capitalism. If community is the weakest part of Europe – despite the fact that Europe is densely populated by communities – it may be because the European project is in itself a response to the bitter experiences of early 20th century nationalisms that lead to totalitarianisms and eventually to World War II. In the last two decades, we have witnessed the rise of a discourse that depicts migration as one of the major external enemies threatening Europe. In order to find an ubi consistam, Europe has been haunting for the ‘Others’ to reject and from which to differentiate (see Fitzpatrick and Bergeron, eds., 1998; Stråth, ed., 2000). But, as Martin Kohli has suggested, “[a]mother and possibly more important way of affirming a European identity is offered by identity constructions which make the difference between the negative past and the positive future their main constituent – utopian identity designs such as that of socialism (which worked well for a while), or that of a future Europe that has overcome its murderous divisions and conflicts. By creating such a symbolic temporal boundary, a spatial (or membership) boundary may become expendable. Europe does not need an external enemy because it has an internal one: its nationalistic past.” (Kohli 2000: 127–128). And not only this. As Peter Wagner has argued, “European political modernity is marked by an often only half-conscious, often also ill-directed, but nevertheless viable and necessary resistance to accepting individualist liberalism as the bottom line and only firm ground of a politics of freedom” (Wagner 2005: 70). That Europeans were to sail between the Scylla of nationalism and the Charybdis of (neo)liberalism cun technocracy was clearly foreseen by Albert Camus: “Europe has lived on its contradictions, flourished on its differences, and, constantly transcending itself thereby, has created a civilization on which the whole world depend even when rejecting it. This is why I do not

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For an earlier critique in this vein, see Wallerstein (1991).
believe in a Europe unified under the weight of an ideology or of a technocracy that would overlook these differences. Any more than I believe in a Europe left to its differences alone - in other words, left to an anarchy of enemy nationalisms” (Camus 1961: 243-244).

To conclude, here is the question this paper was aimed at raising: is Europe destined to be just a sum - or, for that matter, an amalgam - of ‘national societies’ - the odd phrase being the precise result of methodological nationalism - i.e. a continuation of the nation regulatory model ‘by other means’, or does it have an aspiration to become an emancipatory social space of interconnected lived local places? That’s what we are talking about when we talk about migration.

References:


