When and Why? A Critical Survey on Coordination Failure in the Laboratory

Devetag, Giovanna and Ortmann, Andreas (2006) When and Why? A Critical Survey on Coordination Failure in the Laboratory. UNSPECIFIED. (Unpublished)

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    Coordination games with Pareto-ranked equilibria have attracted major theoretical attention over the past two decades. Two early path-breaking sets of experimental studies were widely interpreted as suggesting that coordination failure is a common phenomenon in the laboratory. We identify the major determinants that seem to affect the incidence, and/or emergence, of coordination failure in the lab and review critically the existing experimental studies on coordination games with Pareto-ranked equilibria since that early evidence emerged. We conclude that coordination failure is likely to be the exception rather than the rule, both in the lab and outside of it.

    Item Type: Departmental Technical Report
    Department or Research center: CEEL (Computable and Experimental Economics Laboratory)
    Subjects: UNSPECIFIED
    Uncontrolled Keywords: coordination games, Pareto-ranked equilibria, payoff-asymmetric equilibria, staghunt games, optimization incentives, robustness, coordination, coordination failure
    Additional Information: Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C92
    Report Number: 5-06
    Repository staff approval on: 05 Dec 2006

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