Devetag, Giovanna and Ortmann, Andreas (2006) When and Why? A Critical Survey on Coordination Failure in the Laboratory. UNSPECIFIED. (Unpublished)
Abstract
Coordination games with Pareto-ranked equilibria have attracted major theoretical attention over the past two decades. Two early path-breaking sets of experimental studies were widely interpreted as suggesting that coordination failure is a common phenomenon in the laboratory. We identify the major determinants that seem to affect the incidence, and/or emergence, of coordination failure in the lab and review critically the existing experimental studies on coordination games with Pareto-ranked equilibria since that early evidence emerged. We conclude that coordination failure is likely to be the exception rather than the rule, both in the lab and outside of it.
| Item Type: | Departmental Technical Report |
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| Department or Research center: | CEEL (Computable and Experimental Economics Laboratory) |
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| Subjects: | UNSPECIFIED |
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| Uncontrolled Keywords: | coordination games, Pareto-ranked equilibria, payoff-asymmetric equilibria, staghunt games, optimization incentives, robustness, coordination, coordination failure |
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| Additional Information: | Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C92 |
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| Report Number: | 5-06 |
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| Repository staff approval on: | 05 Dec 2006 |
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