



UNIVERSITY  
OF TRENTO

**DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY**

38050 Povo – Trento (Italy), Via Sommarive 14  
<http://www.dit.unitn.it>

Modelling and Analysing Risk  
at Organizational Level

Yudistira Asnar and Paolo Giorgini

September 2006

Technical Report # DIT-06-063



# Modelling and Analysing Risk at Organizational Level

Yudistira Asnar and Paolo Giorgini

Department of Information and Communication Technology  
University of Trento, Italy  
[yudis.asnar,paolo.giorgini@dit.unitn.it](mailto:yudis.asnar,paolo.giorgini@dit.unitn.it)

**Abstract.** Modeling and analyzing risk is one of the most critical activity in system engineering and approaches like Fault Tree Analysis, Event Tree Analysis, Failure Modes and Criticality Analysis have been proposed in literature. All these approaches focus on the system-to-be without considering the impact of the associated risks to the organization where the system will operate. On the other hand, the tendency is more and more to consider software development as a part of organizational development. In this paper, we propose a framework to model and reason about risk at organizational level, namely considering the system-to-be along the organizational setting. The framework extends Tropos, a methodology that has been proved effective in modeling strategic interests of the stakeholders at organizational level. We introduce a number of different means that help the analyst to identify and enumerate relevant treatments for risk mitigation. Experimental results are finally presented and discussed.

## 1 Introduction

Software systems are more and more part of our life (look how many computers and electronic gadgets are around you), and very often this introduces a broad and strong influence of software in our daily life decisions. The tendency is to consider them as integral and active part of the environment and for this their development has to be considered as part of the social-network development. In this direction, some software engineering methodologies have been introduced (e.g., Tropos [1] and KAOS [2]) to capture since the early phases of the software development the relationships between the software-to-be and the organizational setting. In this new scenario, traditional techniques for modeling and analyzing risk (e.g., Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [3], Event Tree Analysis (ETA) [3], Failure Mode Effect and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) [4]) have to be reconsidered to extend the analysis to the organization in which the system-to-be will operate. Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) [5] assesses a risk answering to three basic questions: (1) what can go wrong? (2) how likely is it? and (3) what are the consequences? Those traditional techniques are commonly used in Reliability and Safety community, but unfortunately these techniques are not thought to

model the risks at organizational level and they mainly focus on the risks at the system level.

We already have proposed a modeling and reasoning framework to consider risk (more in general *uncertain event*) at organizational level [6]. The framework extends the Tropos goal models [7,8] proposing a three layers analysis (i.e., goal, event, and treatment) and algorithms for qualitative reasoning. Section 2 summarizes briefly the framework. In this paper, we extended and refine the framework proposing new types of relationship (*modification relation*) that allow us to model and analyze circumstances where a countermeasure mitigates a risk reducing its impact and not only the likelihood. Along these relationships, we will introduce new axioms, a refinement of the risk analysis process, and novel reasoning mechanisms (Section 3). We, also, define new types of mitigation actions that can be applied as a part of the solution and we define the guidelines to choose and model them (4). We conclude the paper with some experimental results (Section 5) and a final discussion (Section 6).


## 2 Tropos Goal-Risk Analysis

Tropos has proposed a formal framework to refine stakeholders' goals and end up with elicits the requirements. The framework can also model the existence of uncertain events, mainly risks, that could give influence to the fulfilment of the goals and treatments that need to be taken to manage the effect of risks. There are three entities that construct goal models, namely Goal, Event (e.g., risk, opportunity), and Treatment (e.g., tasks, countermeasure). Goal analysis results in a number of goal models represented as a graph  $\langle \mathcal{G}, \mathcal{R} \rangle$ , where  $\mathcal{G}$  are nodes (i.e., goals, events, and treatments) and  $\mathcal{R}$  are relations (decomposition or contribution relations) among them. If  $(N_1, \dots, N_n) \xrightarrow{r} N$  is one of the node relations in  $\mathcal{R}$ ,  $N_1, \dots, N_n$  are called as the *source nodes* and  $N$  is the *target node* of relation  $r$ .

Each node has two attributes **SAT**-  $Sat(N)$  and **DEN**-  $Den(N)$  and  $N \in \{G, E, T\}$ , which quantify the value of evidence for node being satisfied and denied, respectively. Those attributes are indicated as node label and are represented by 6 different satisfaction predicates:

- $FS(N), FD(N)$ : there is (at least) *full* evidence that goal  $G$  is satisfied (or denied), event  $E$  occurs, or treatment  $T$  succeeds;
- $FS(N), PD(N)$ : there is (at least) *partial* evidence that goal  $G$  is satisfied (or denied), event  $E$  occurs, or treatment  $T$  succeeds;
- $NS(N), ND(N)$ : there is *none* evidence that goal  $G$  is satisfied (or denied), event  $E$  occurs, or treatment  $T$  succeeds. Actually, they are the same with  $T$  predicate in [9]. It is not mandatory to write these predicates in formalization; they could leave implicitly.

The predicates state that there is *at least* a given level of evidence for the node achievement, and it implies that  $FS(N) \geq PS(N) \geq NS(N)$  and  $FD(N) \geq PD(N) \geq ND(N)$ , with intended meaning  $x \geq y \leftrightarrow x \rightarrow y$ .



**Fig. 1.** Part of Goal Model for the Vehicle Production Department

Each entity has separate layer of analysis (see Fig. 1). And each entity can be analyzed using the relations (e.g., decompositions and contributions). Qualitative goal analysis in Tropos starts with a number of stakeholders' goals (called top goals) and each of them is refined by decomposition (AND or OR) into subgoals.

For example, consider to model the strategic objectives of *reduce labor costs* ( $G_8$ ) is OR-decomposed into *reduce man-power by machine* ( $G_{13}$ ) and *reduce salaries* ( $G_4$ ). This decomposition and refinements will continue until the goals are not considered tangible goals, i.e., when there is an actor that can fulfill the goal.

After analyzing the goal layer, we continue to analyze the relevant event that could influence the fulfillment of the goal in goal layer. We define an event as an uncertain circumstance that could influence to the fulfillment of goals [6]. Events can be identified applying different approaches (e.g., obstacle analysis in KAOS [10], Taxonomy-base risk identification [11], or Risk in Finance [12]). Afterwards, an event is analyzed by a decomposition relation into sub-events until each leaf event can be considered as an independent event. In our framework, a *risk* is defined as an uncertain event with negative impact and an opportunity with positive impact. We represent *likelihood* by the level of evidence that supports and prevents the occurrence of the event (SAT and DEN), and the level of influence of an event is encoded as the type of contribution relation between event and goal. Since the effect of an event obstructs a goal only when it occurs (i.e., denial of an event does not give any impacts), in our model we use only  $r_S$  relations, i.e.,  $++S$ ,  $+S$ ,  $-S$ , and  $--S$ , between an event and goals.

An event can influence more than one goal. For example, in Fig. 1 the event *strike* ( $E_5$ ) obstructs the satisfaction of *reducing salaries* ( $G_{14}$ ) because in this circumstance labors can demand an increment of the salary. On the other hand, it also obstructs the goal *improve production chain* ( $G_5$ ) since it can compromise and slow down the production. An event can be considered as a risk for certain

goals and at the same time as an opportunity for other goals. For instance, the event have a *new competitor* ( $E_7$ ) is a risk that obstructs the achievement of the goal *high specialized labour* ( $G_{15}$ ) because the competitor can offer better conditions to the labor. However, the event can also be seen as an opportunity for the goal *improve work environment* ( $G_{12}$ ), because it gives more motivations to the employees to compete with other companies. Event refinement will continue until leaf-events are assessable (i.e., we can assess the likelihood of leaf-event) and the modeler needs to ensure each leaf-event is mutually exclusive.

Once the events have been analyzed, the modeler identifies and analyzes the countermeasures to be adopted in order to mitigate the risks. The mitigation of a risk can be realized in two different ways: reducing the *likelihood* or reducing the *impact*. However in our previous work [6], we did not support the mitigation with reducing the impact of risk. In next section, we explain how to model this type of mitigation in Tropos goal model.

Similarly to goals and events, for countermeasures we use SAT and DEN to represent the evidence that supports and prevents the action. A countermeasure has effect on the event layer, and in particular over risks. We represent the *effect* of a countermeasure as a relation, where its strength is expressed by the type of contribution relations. As for events, we are interested to the propagation of the evidence for the success of a countermeasure (SAT) and therefore we limit the relations between countermeasures and events to  $r_S$  relations. A countermeasure mitigates a risk when it adds (propagates) evidence for its denial.

In our model we also allow for relations between the treatment layer and the goal layer. This is useful to model situations where a countermeasure adopted to mitigate a risk has also a contribution (especially negative) to some goals. For instance in Fig. 1, the countermeasure *create a labor association* ( $T_2$ ) can mitigate the likelihood of the event *strike* ( $E_5$ ) – of course this is not always true. However, the association can have a better bargaining power w.r.t. the individual worker and obtain an increment of the salaries. This produces a negative effect on the satisfaction of the goal *reduce salaries* ( $G_{14}$ ).

After finish building the model, we can start analyzing the model and eliciting the most reasonable solution to fulfill the stakeholders' goals. The solution consists of the leaf goals that need to be fulfilled, the treatments that need to be employed to manage the risks of the model and the total cost (leaf goals and treatments). The detail explanation of each step can be seen in [6].

### 3 Modification Relation in Goal-Risk Model

In previous work, we realize a possibility that a countermeasure mitigate the risk by reducing its impacts, which was not supported, besides reducing the likelihood. This paper will extent Tropos Goal-Risk Model to model it by introducing *modification relation*. The basic idea of this relation is adding evidence s.t. changes the type of contribution relations.

Modification relation is defined as a relation from Treatment- $T$  to the contribution link:

$$T \xrightarrow{r_S} r$$


$r$  is the type of contribution link, and  $r_S$  is the types of modification relation (i.e.,  $++_S, +_S, --_S, -_S$ ). The difference semantics of modification relations can be seen at its axioms at Fig. 2. In new axiomatization, we can see new symbol (i.e.,  $\emptyset$ ) for contribution relation. It means the contribution relation does not deliver any evidence to the target node. For instance (Axiom 2), it states that in  $--_S$  modification relation, once treatment  $T$  has *full* evidence being satisfied, it will nullify ( $\emptyset$ ) the target contribution relation (i.e., before is  $--$  relation).

<b>Treatment</b>	<b>Invariant Axioms</b>	
$T : \quad$	$FS(T) \rightarrow PS(T)$	(1)
<b>Treatment to cont. rel.</b>	<b>Relation Axioms</b>	
$T \xrightarrow{--_S} [--] : \quad$	$FS(T) \rightarrow [\emptyset]$	(2)
	$PS(T) \rightarrow [--]$	(3)
$T \xrightarrow{--_S} [++]: \quad$	$FS(T) \rightarrow [\emptyset]$	(4)
	$PS(T) \rightarrow [+]$	(5)
$T \xrightarrow{--_S} [-] \bigvee T \xrightarrow{--_S} [+]: \quad$	$PS(T) \rightarrow [\emptyset]$	(6)
$T \xrightarrow{-_S} [--] : \quad$	$FS(T) \rightarrow [-]$	(7)
$T \xrightarrow{-_S} [+] : \quad$	$FS(T) \rightarrow [+]$	(8)
$T \xrightarrow{-_S} [-] : \quad$	$FS(T) \rightarrow [\emptyset]$	(9)
$T \xrightarrow{-_S} [+]: \quad$	$FS(T) \rightarrow [\emptyset]$	(10)
$T \xrightarrow{+_S} [-] : \quad$	$FS(T) \rightarrow [--]$	(11)
$T \xrightarrow{+_S} [+]: \quad$	$FS(T) \rightarrow [++]$	(12)
$T \xrightarrow{++_S} [-] : \quad$	$PS(T) \rightarrow [--]$	(13)
$T \xrightarrow{++_S} [+]: \quad$	$PS(T) \rightarrow [++]$	(14)

**Fig. 2.** Basic Axioms of Modification Relations

As an example the treatment *manage oil supply* ( $T_1$ ) does not reduce the likelihood of the risk *oil price raise* ( $E_1$ ) (as we model before in [6]). The correct modeling way of that circumstance is the  $T_1$  mitigates  $E_1$  by reducing the impact of *oil price raise* to the goal (see Fig. 3(a)). If we assume  $T_3$  has evidence *full* of being succeeded then the initial model (Fig. 3(a)) evolves becoming to another model in Fig 3(b) based on Axiom 7.

Finally, we can categorize the treatment into two classes based on its influence: *evidence treatment* (i.e., a treatment that changes the value of evidence of target node) and *effect treatment* (i.e., a treatment that changes the type of contribution relation). A treatment can occupy both classes. The effect treatment is



**Fig. 3.** Modification Relation

preferable while an event has both impacts (positive and negative), because by means of this treatment we can reduce only the negative impact instead both of them. If we use evidence treatment on this circumstance, then we will lose also the opportunity besides reducing the risk.

### 3.1 Analysis Mechanisms

The new axioms that have been introduced in previous section, causes a change on the model itself instead changes only the values of model. This fact results an adjustment to the risk analysis steps and several algorithms need to be introduced to reason on the new goal model. In the new framework, we can do the similar analysis that has been performed in previous work [6]. We refine the steps of how a modeler performs analysis on the goal model with considering related risks and countermeasures and eliciting the set of optimal solution in Algorithm 1. This framework is aiming to support modeller to explore the possible alternative and calculate the defined parameters (e.g., number of SAT and DEN evidence and the cost of alternative solution), and the decision should be taken manually (i.e., either by modeler or stakeholder).

The Algorithm 1, basically, is alike with the previous one [6] and the only different is *Adjust\_Model* in line 5. Basically, the analysis process consists of the following two steps:

1. find the alternative solutions (line 2-3);
2. evaluate each alternative (line 4-19);
  - (a) adjust the goal mode based on the evaluated alternative (line 5);
  - (b) assess the risks obstruction to the goal layer (line 9-11);
  - (c) assess the countermeasures effectiveness to mitigate the risks (line 12-17).

The process starts taking in an input the goal model and a set of desired values for top goals (i.e., satisfaction values-SAT and acceptable risk values-DEN), and a number of goals as possible candidates for the final solution (input goals). Then *Backward\_Reasoning* [8] (line 2) elicits a set of possible assignment values for the input goals such that satisfies the desired values. The modeler chooses a

---

**Algorithm 1** Risk\_Analysis Process

---

**Ensure:** analyse risk for each alternative solutions and find necessary countermeasures to ensure the satisfaction of top goals.

**Require:** goal\_model  $\langle \mathcal{G}, \mathcal{R} \rangle$ , label\_array top\_goals, node\_array input\_goals, label\_array events

```
1: solution_array solution {solution that has already encompassed risks and necessary countermeasures}
2: alt_solution  $\leftarrow$  Backward_Reasoning( $\langle \mathcal{G}, \mathcal{R} \rangle$ , nil, top_goals, input_goals)
3: candidate_solution  $\leftarrow$  Select_Can_Solution(alt_solution)
   {candidate_solution  $\subseteq$  alt_solution}
4: for all  $S_i \in$  candidate_solution do
5:    $\langle \mathcal{G}, \mathcal{R}' \rangle \leftarrow$  Adjust_Model( $\langle \mathcal{G}, \mathcal{R} \rangle$ ) {propagates all modification relations to all related contribution relations}
6:   if Satisfy( $\langle \mathcal{G}, \mathcal{R}' \rangle$ , top_goals,  $\langle S_i, events, nil \rangle$ ) then
7:     add(solution,  $\langle S_i, nil, Calc\_Cost(S_i, nil) \rangle$ )
8:   else
9:     boolean_array Related_Goals  $\leftarrow$  Related_Goals( $\langle \mathcal{G}, \mathcal{R}' \rangle$ ,  $S_i$ )
10:    labels  $\leftarrow$  Standard_Forward_Reasoning( $\langle \mathcal{G}, \mathcal{R}' \rangle$ ,  $S_i$ )
11:    acc_events  $\leftarrow$  Calc_Event(labels, related_goals.events)
12:    nec_treatment  $\leftarrow$  Backward_Reasoning( $\langle \mathcal{G}, \mathcal{R}' \rangle$ , events, acc_events, avail_treatment)
13:    for all  $T_j \in$  nec_treatment do
14:      if Satisfy( $\langle \mathcal{G}, \mathcal{R}' \rangle$ , top_goals,  $\langle S_i, events, T_j \rangle$ ) then
15:        add(solution,  $\langle S_i, T_j, Calc\_Cost(S_i, T_j) \rangle$ )
16:      end if
17:    end for
18:  end if
19: end for
```

---

subset of the alternatives on the basis of a certain criteria (e.g., minimum-cost [8], softgoals) called *candidate\_solution* (line 3). The rest of analysis process will be limited to this subset. Each *candidate\_solution* is now evaluated against risks and then necessary countermeasures are introduced (line 4-19). Before start evaluating the goal model, we need to *adjust\_model* (line 5) by following Algorithm 2 (i.e., it applies all the effects of modification relations). Then, the modeller checks whether the *candidate\_solution* in adjusted model needs countermeasures to obtain the desired values in the top goals. If not the *candidate\_solution* is added directly to the *solution* and its cost is calculated (line 7). Otherwise, countermeasures must be introduced in the *candidate\_solution* (line 9-17).

For applying modification relation, we perform Algorithm 2 with taking in  $\langle \mathcal{G}, \mathcal{R} \rangle$  as initial goal model and a set of initial values of input goals. The Algorithm 2 will modify the model (i.e., strictly speaking  $\mathcal{R}$ ) until the model stable (line 5), i.e., no change anymore, in terms of the relation in goal model and the final values. First step is doing *New\_Forward\_Reasoning* [6] to gain the final evidence values of all nodes in the model (in this step, modification relations are not considered). Based on the those values, we apply *modification relations* on the initial model  $\langle \mathcal{G}, \mathcal{R} \rangle$  by changing the type of all related *contribution relations* following *Update\_Relation* (Algorithm 3) and results the new model  $\langle \mathcal{G}, \mathcal{R}' \rangle$ . *Update\_Relation* basically calculates all the impacts of modification relations over a particular contribution relation. *Apply\_Rules\_Modify\_Rel* is a function to define the effect of a modification relation over a contribution relation, that is underlain by the axioms in Fig. 2. If a contribution relation relates with several modification relations, we will take the worst possible modification. For that purpose, we define the order of contribution relation types:

$-- \ll - \ll \emptyset$  and  $\emptyset \ll + \ll ++$ , with intended meaning  $--$  is worse than  $-$  and respectively for others. This principle (in line (5) and (7)) intends to make the organization be prepared with the worst condition.

---

**Algorithm 2** Adjust\_Model

---

**Ensure:** Adjust Goal Model (Attribute values and Relation Types)  
**Require:** goal\_model  $\langle \mathcal{G}, \mathcal{R} \rangle$ , label\_array init\_val  
1: goal\_model cur\_model, old\_model  
2: label\_array cur\_val  
3: cur\_model  $\leftarrow \langle \mathcal{G}, \mathcal{R} \rangle$   
4: cur\_val  $\leftarrow$  init\_val  
5: **while**  $old\_model \neq cur\_model$  and  $old\_value \neq cur\_value$  **do**  
6:   old\_model  $\leftarrow$  cur\_model  
7:   old\_value  $\leftarrow$  cur\_value  
8:   cur\_value  $\leftarrow$  NewForwardReasoning(cur\_model, init\_val)  
9:   **for all**  $R_i \in \mathcal{R}$  s.t.  $\exists Rel \in \mathcal{R} : target(Rel) = R_i$  **do**  
10:     cur\_model.R[i]  $\leftarrow$  Update\_Relation(i, init\_model, cur\_val)  
11:   **end for**  
12: **end while**  
13: Normalize\_Model(cur\_model) {Pruning relation (R) s.t.  $R = [\xrightarrow{\emptyset}]$  or  $target(R) = [\xrightarrow{r}]$ }  
14: **return** cur\_model

---



---

**Algorithm 3** Update\_Relation

---

**Ensure:** Change the type of contribution in goal model  
**Require:** int i, goal\_model  $\langle \mathcal{G}, \mathcal{R} \rangle$ , label\_array value  
1: **for all**  $R_j \in \mathcal{R}$  s.t.  $target(R_j) = \langle \mathcal{G}, \mathcal{R} \rangle.R_i$  **do**  
2:   arc<sub>j</sub>  $\leftarrow$  Apply\_Rules\_Modify\_Rel( $R_j$ , value)  
3: **end for**  
4: **if** Is\_Negative(old.model.R[i]) **then** {the type is risk relation i.e., “- or --”}  
5:   rel\_type  $\leftarrow$  Max\_Array(arc)  
6: **else** {opportunity relation i.e., “+ or ++”}  
7:   rel\_type  $\leftarrow$  Min\_Array(arc)  
8: **end if**  
9: **return** rel\_type

---

## 4 Alternative Solution of Risks in Goal-Risk Model

After extending the goal model to coup with all possible behavior of a treatment (e.g., by changing the evidence value of target nodes or by changing the impact of contribution relation). This paper will also explain the guidelines for a modeler while facing the risks in order to manage them such that acceptable for the fulfillment of stakeholders’ goals.

Basically, there are two way that could be taken while we have a risk in our organization, the first is trying to find other alternative s.t there is no risk related with it and the other is mitigating the risk s.t. it is acceptable. Once the modelers decide to elicit a treatment to mitigate a risks, they need to be aware with the effects to other entities (i.e., goal, event, treatment).


We categorize treatments into 5 types of measure that can be used to overcome the risk: avoidance, prevention, alleviation, detection, and retention. The order of the types can be seen also as the steps in eliciting the treatments. First, the modelers try to find the way to *avoid* the risks, if it is not possible then they should try to *prevent* the occurrence the risks. If the prevention measures are not adequate then try to identify the *alleviation* measures. If it is also not adequate, then they need to identify the *detection* measures otherwise they should be ready with any *retention* measures.

The next passage will detailed them by specifying what are the model characteristics that can lead in choosing the proper type of measures and what is the consequences (advantage and disadvantage) of each type. However, the model characteristics are defined, as follow:

- for goal (i.e., is defined as leaf goal in goal layer): the importance of the goal and its fulfillment type (i.e., achieve goal, maintain goal, and achieve-maintain goal [13]);
- for event (i.e., is defined as top event in event layer): the impacts and likelihood of the event, the structure of event tree in event layer, and the type of risks (e.g., avoidable, preventable, reduceable);
- for treatment (i.e., is defined as leaf treatment in treatment layer), the success rate in mitigating the risks, the cost of the treatment.

#### 4.1 Avoidance

It defines as an activity that tries to achieve the stakeholders' goals by choosing an alternative in which there is no risks related to it.




**Fig. 4.** Avoidance Means

*Model characteristic* for this type is the goal fulfillment is very important for the stakeholders and most of the time, the goal is categorized as a maintain goal or an achieve-maintain goal. Thus, the modeler should ensure its fulfilment all the time. However, this type of measures is not always possible to be elicited, there is a circumstance in which the modeler do not have any alternatives to fulfill the goal with risk free. For example in Fig. 4, the modeler can fulfill  $G_8$  by means of choosing  $G_{13}$  or  $G_{14}$ . In this scenario, the modeler choose  $G_{13}$  instead of  $G_{14}$  because  $G_8$  must be fulfilled all over the time.

*Consequence* of this type is no need to introduce any treatments that possibly give bad impacts to the goal layer besides the good ones. The only possible drawback of this type is the risk-free alternative could be more costly than the total cost risky alternative and its treatments. Therefore, there is a possibility which the cost of  $G_{13}$  is higher than the cost  $G_{14}$  and its treatment (e.g.,  $T_2$ ).

## 4.2 Prevention

This activity demands the modeler to elicit any treatments that can prevent the occurrence of the negative event. The notion of prevent means reduce the risk until acceptable value for fulfillment of stakeholders' goals.



**Fig. 5.** Prevention Means


*Model characteristic* that suits for this type is the risk obstructs significantly the stakeholders' goals and unavoidable. This type of measures are carried on by reducing the likelihood of related leaf-events s.t. the likelihood of the top-event is also reduced. To identify the related leaf-events, we can use the same technique that commonly used in defining minimal cut-set in FTA [3]. For instance (in

Fig. 5), *build back up test environment* ( $T_6$ ) is a measure that dedicated to eliminate the possibility of unavailability of testing environment because of *broken test environment* ( $E_9$ ) occurs. This type is less economic while meets the risk with many alternatives of occurrence (or-decomposition), because the risk will be really reduced when we prevent all the leaf-events of the risk. For instance, *Regular Training and Assessment for Test Designer* ( $T_9$ ) is not really effective to reduce the *ignorance of testing employees* ( $E_{11}$ ) because it could be caused of the *ignorance of tester* ( $E_{13}$ ).

*Consequence* of this approach is it can not guarantee 100% risk-free of the model, differently with avoidance measure, because there is a chance that the treatment is failed to mitigate the risk. The cost of prevention measure is certain whether the risk occurs or not. Therefore, this type is not suited to mitigate the risk with very low likelihood.

#### 4.3 Alleviation

This measure intends to reduce the effect of risk to goal layer by employing *effect treatment* in proper place (i.e., the impact relation between top event and goal).



**Fig. 6.** Alleviation Means

*Model characteristic* for this type is if the modeler can not find the way to avoid or prevent the risk. For instance (in Fig. 6), *oil price raise* ( $E_1$ ) can be caused

by *oil stock manipulation* ( $E_2$ ) or *gulf war* ( $E_3$ ). The vehicle company does not have capability to reduce the likelihood of both events therefore the only possible thing to do is to mitigate s.t. the impact of  $E_1$  is less harm to the goal layer. Besides that, this type is suited for the circumstance which there are so many leaf-events need to be mitigated in order to prevent a top event s.t. the total cost of mitigation action of the risk is not economic as we mention in prevention measure.

*Consequence* of having un-mitigated risk will follow the success rate of treatment in alleviating. Therefore, this measure is recommended to be applied if the modeler is really sure it can reduce the impact of the risk otherwise the organization will suffer an un-mitigate risk. The probability of spending budget to do this action will follow the likelihood of top event/risk and the likelihood of top event is always less or equal than all its sub-events. Thus, it is very suitable for the unlikely risks.

#### 4.4 Detection


A treatment mitigates a intermediate event in event tree s.t. it reduces the risk. In this circumstance, actually the failure has occurred within the organization but the impacts of risk have not delivered yet to the goal layer.

*Model characteristic* for this type is once the modeler can not find mitigation action with previous types. Moreover, this type will reduce the cost of treatment if several events/risks share their sub-tree, because the treatment can mitigate the overlapped sub-tree and it will reduce all the risks at the end. Typically, it is done using evidence treatment. For example (in Fig. 7, *re-schedule and maintain test environment* ( $T_7$ ) will reduce the likelihood of *overload test environment usage* ( $E_8$ ), and consequently reduces the possibility of *stress condition* ( $E_{19}$ ) for employees which can obstruct the achievement of the goal to *improve work environment condition* ( $G_{12}$ ) and it also reduces the chance of having *broken test environment* ( $E_9$ ) that could lead us to the denial of goal to do *test vehicle* ( $G_6$ ) properly.

*Consequence* of this types will be catastrophic if the measure fails to reduce the intermediate event, because it could cause more than one top-event/risk. Therefore, the modeler should be aware of the final consequences if the countermeasure fails and how much is the success rate of the countermeasure before choosing this type. The probability of cost of the detection measures follows the likelihood of its intermediate event (i.e., equal or higher than likelihood of top events).

#### 4.5 Retention

It is the last alternative for an organization to deal with its risk, once we can not find any treatments from the previous types. This type of treatment is usually




**Fig. 7.** Detection Means

employed when the organization do not have capability to mitigate the risk (e.g., war, inflation, new competitor, natural disaster). For instance (in Fig. 8), the risk of having *new competitor* ( $E_7$ ) is beyond the company capabilities and it could obstruct the goal of having *high specialized labor* ( $G_{15}$ ) because they can give better offer to the specialize labor. The only thing that company can do is trying to *give incentive for specialized labor* ( $T_5$ ) s.t. the achievement of  $G_{15}$  is maintained. Transfer the risk to an insurance company, restore the obstructed goals, and design fault tolerance system can be categorized in this type. Because they do not reduce the likelihood nor the effects of risks, they just try to make the consequence of the risk is less catastrophic.

*Consequence* of applying this type is there is a certain period that the goal might be un-satisfied before it is restored. Besides that, this measure can be seen as a mean to fulfill the goal besides only as a treatment for the risk.

## 5 Experimental Result

In this section, we briefly present some experimental results of a case study Vehicle Manufacture (in Fig. 9) obtained with the new algorithm and the help



**Fig. 8.** Retention Means

of an extension tool of the Goal Reasoning Tool<sup>1</sup> (GR-Tool) developed within the Tropos project.


For their implementation we started from the GR-Tool reasoning mechanisms and we have re-implemented them introducing the necessary modifications as described in Section 3. For more details about the GR-Tool and its extension we suggest to visit the Tropos web page.

Suppose we want to obtain a fully satisfaction of all top goals i.e., *reducing cost* ( $G_1$ ), *increasing quality of vehicles* ( $G_2$ ), and *increasing Return of Investment(ROI)* ( $G_{17}$ ) with avoid any risks on them. So we have as input  $\{Sat(G_1) = F, Sat(G_2) = F, Sat(G_{17}) = F\}$ . Executing *Backward Reasoning* we find a set of possible solutions. For the case study, we have 14 alternative solutions (i.e., minimum assignment of input goals s.t. they achieve top goals) as seen in Table. 1 (we eliminate the input goals that are taken by all alternative). In next passage, we concentrate in analyzing the  $S1$  which are the second cheapest alternative. This choice is taken because  $S13$  and  $S14$  are using  $G_{14}$  to fulfill top goals, i.e.,  $G_1$  and  $G_{17}$ . This manner is too risky because once  $G_{14}$  fail then there are more than one top goal will follow. Of course, other criteria can be adopted for the selection of the alternative solution to be analyzed.

Table 2 summarizes the label values during the reasoning on  $S1$ . Forward reasoning is applied then to calculate the effects of the selected solution to the other goals of the model (column “Goal-Out” Table 2). Now, let suppose we have evidence about the occurrence of some of the events and want to see the impact of them on the goal layer. For example, considering the event assignment reported in column “Event-In” (i.e.,  $Sat(E_7, E_{16}, E_{17}) = F$  and  $Sat(E_2, E_6, E_{12}, E_{13}, E_{14}, E_{18}) = P$ ), we obtain that (“Event-Out”) top goals  $G_1$ ,  $G_2$ ,  $G_{17}$  are partially denied. In order to re-obtain the desiderata values for top goals we need to find necessary treatments able to mitigate the risks. There are four possible counter-measure sets that could be taken to mitigate the risks (see Table 5) and the total

---

<sup>1</sup> <http://sesa.dit.unitn.it/goaleditor/>



**Fig. 9.** Goal Model for the Vehicle Manufacture

cost of countermeasures can be calculated summing up the single cost of input treatments. In this experiment, we adopt  $C_1$  based on their costs and their side effects. Even  $C_1$  is not the cheapest, it is worth because by choosing  $T_4$  instead  $T_3$ ,  $T_4$  gives positive effects to the achievement of  $G_7$  (i.e., even it is not one of the input goals). Finally, the tool generates the final configuration with input  $S_1$  and  $C_1$  (in column "Treatment-Out") where our desired values for top goals are again obtained except  $G_{17}$  (i.e.,  $Den(G_{17}) = \emptyset$ ). In this combination (i.e.,  $S_1$  and  $C_1$ ), the effect of  $E_1 \xrightarrow{-S} G_9$  is nullified by applying  $T_4$  s.t.  $E_1 \xrightarrow{\emptyset} G_9$ , and it also the case for  $E_7 \xrightarrow{-S} G_{15}$  and  $E_{14} \xrightarrow{-S} E_9$ .

## 6 Conclusions

In this paper, we have presented a framework to model and reason about risk within the requirements engineering process. We have adopted and extended the Tropos goal modeling framework and proposed qualitative reasoning algorithms to analyse risk during the process of evaluation and selection of alternatives.

Input Goal	Cost	S1	S2	S3	S4	S5	S6	S7	S8	S9	S10	S11	S12	S13	S14
G07: Use Raw Materials Efficiently	4	X	X	X	X										
G09: Reduce Energy Costs	5					X	X	X	X						
G13: Reduce Man-Power by Machine	9									X	X	X	X		
G14: Reduce Salaries	8												X	X	
G15: High Specialized Labour	7	X	X			X	X			X	X			X	
G16: Supervise Labours Tightly	7			X	X			X	X			X	X		X
G23: Reduce Expenses	5	X	X		X		X		X		X				
G24: Reduce Tax Payment	5		X	X		X		X	X		X		X		
<b>Total Cost</b>		16	16	16	16	17	17	17	17	21	21	21	21	15	15

Table 1. Cost of Alternative Solutions

	Cost	C1	C2	C3	C4
T02: Create Labour Association	6	X	X	X	X
T03: Have Partnership with Oil Company	6			X	X
T04: Have Supply Chain Mgmt Sys	8	X	X		
T05: Give Incentive for Specialized Labour	7	X	X	X	X
T06: Build Backup Test Env.	8		X		X
T07: Re-Schedule-Maintain Test Env.	6	X	X	X	X
T08: Re-assess Testing Method with Ext. Consultant	5	X	X	X	X
T09: Training and Assessment for Test Designer	5	X	X	X	X
T10: Have Long Contract for Specialized Labour	6	X	X	X	X
<b>Total Cost</b>		43	51	41	49

However, this work has overcame one limitation of previous work which ,now, it supports relationships between nodes (goals, events, tasks) and can model situations where a treatment mitigates the risk reducing its impact on the goal layer. by introducing the possibility to establish relations also between nodes and arcs.

Besides that, this paper explains several type of measures that typically is used to deal with the existence of risks in the organization. They are categories as: avoidance, prevention, detection, alleviation, and retention. The modeler should understand the model characteristics before choosing them, especially: prevention, detection, alleviation, and be aware of their consequences. Because avoidance is usually chosen if the condition allows, and retention is the last option if there is no other type of measures that suits with the model. Thus, we would emphasize in two consideration points in placing the measures:

- Possibility of spending budget mitigating the risk

$$Poss(Cost\_Prevention) \gg Poss(Cost\_Detection) \gg Poss(Cost\_Alleviation)$$

For prevention measure, it is certain that the organization will spend the budget for this measures, and detection measure is less than prevention measure but is still greater than the possibility of spending of alleviation measure.

- Success rate that is demanded for each type:

$$Pr(Success\_Prevention) \ll Pr(Success\_Alleviation) \ll Pr(Success\_Detection)$$

	Goal		Event		Treat.		
	In	Out	In	Out	Out		
	S	S	D	S	D	S	D
E01: Oil Price Raise	-	-	-	P	-	P	-
E02: Oil Stock Manipulation	-	-	-	P	P	-	P
E03: Gulf War	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
E04: Increase Minimum Salary Policy	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
E05: Strike	-	-	-	P	-	-	-
E06: Increase Unemployment Rate	-	-	-	P	P	-	P
E07: New Competitor	-	-	-	F	F	-	F
E08: Overload Test Env. Usage	-	-	-	F	-	-	-
E09: Broken Test Env.	-	-	-	P	-	-	-
E10: Inadequate Test Method	-	-	-	P	-	-	-
E11: Ignorance of Testing Employees	-	-	-	P	-	P	-
E12: Ignorance of Test Designer	-	-	-	P	P	-	P
E13: Ignorance of Tester	-	-	-	P	P	-	P
E14: Improper Test Design	-	-	-	P	P	-	P
E15: Bad Test Scheduling	-	-	-	P	-	P	-
E16: Heavy-Weight Test Design	-	-	-	F	F	-	F
E17: Tight Testing Schedule	-	-	-	F	F	-	F
E18: Run out resources	-	-	-	P	P	-	P
E19: Stress Situation	-	-	-	P	-	-	-
G01: Reduce Costs	-	F	-	-	F	P	F
G02: Increase Quality of Vehicles	-	F	-	-	F	P	F
G03: Reduce Resources Costs	-	F	-	-	F	P	F
G04: Have Efficient Production System	F	F	-	F	F	-	F
G05: Improve Production Chain	-	F	-	-	F	P	F
G06: Test Vehicles	F	F	-	F	F	P	F
G07: Use Raw Materials Efficiently	-	-	-	-	-	P	-
G08: Reduce Labour Costs	-	-	-	P	P	P	-
G09: Reduce Energy Costs	F	F	-	F	F	P	-
G10: Use Monitoring Mechanism	F	F	-	F	F	-	F
G11: Improve Labour Efficiency	-	F	-	-	F	-	F
G12: Improve Work Environments	F	F	-	F	F	P	F
G13: Reduce Man-Power by Machine	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
G14: Reduce Salaries	-	-	P	-	P	P	P
G15: High Specialized Labour	F	F	-	F	F	P	F
G16: Supervise Labours Tightly	-	P	-	-	P	-	P
G17: Increase ROI	-	F	-	-	F	P	F
G18: Reduce Investment Rate	-	F	-	-	F	-	F
G19: Decrease Cost	-	F	-	-	F	-	F
G20: Increase Revenue	F	F	-	F	P	F	P
G21: Prevent New Sys. Investment	F	F	-	F	F	-	F
G22: Selective Investment	F	F	-	F	F	-	F
G23: Reduce Expenses	F	F	-	F	F	-	F
G24: Reduce Tax Payment	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
T01: Manage Oil Supply	-	-	-	-	-	F	-
T02: Create Labour Association	-	-	-	-	-	P	-
T03: Have Partnership with Oil Company	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
T04: Have Supply Chain Mgmt Sys	-	-	-	-	-	F	-
T05: Give Incentive for Specialized Labour	-	-	-	-	-	F	-
T06: Build Backup Test Env.	-	-	-	-	P	-	P
T07: Re-Schedule-Maintain Test Env.	-	-	-	-	-	F	-
T08: Re-assess Testing Method with Ext. Consultant	-	-	-	-	-	F	-
T09: Training and Assessment for Test Designer	-	-	-	-	-	F	-
T10: Have Long Contract for Specialized Labour	-	-	-	-	-	P	-

Table 2. SAT-DEN values in Risk Analysis of S1

Before applying the measure in the model, the modeler should ensure the success rate of the measure in mitigating the risk deploy it in the model. The detection measure is demanded the highest success rate because it will mitigate more than one top-risk, so its failure can cause several obstructions in goal layer. The alleviation measure needs less than detection one but is higher than prevention measure. Because the prevention measure usually works with several others, its effect of failure can be reduced by the others, and it is not the case for the alleviation because one it fails the impact of the risk will deliver to goal layer as it is (i.e., typically, it obstructs only one goal).

Finally, as done for goal models we want to propose also quantitative reasoning mechanisms where evidence is expressed in term of probability model.

## References

1. Bresciani, P., Perini, A., Giorgini, P., Giunchiglia, F., Mylopoulos, J.: Tropos: An Agent-Oriented Software Development Methodology. *Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems* **8**(3) (2004) 203–236
2. van Lamsweerde, A., Letier, E.: Handling Obstacles in Goal-Oriented Requirements Engineering. *IEEE Transaction Software Engineering* **26**(10) (2000) 978–1005
3. Stamatelatos, M., Vesely, W., Dugan, J., Fragola, J., Minarick, J., Railsback, J.: Fault Tree Handbook with Aerospace Applications. NASA (2002)
4. DoD: Military Standard, Procedures for Performing a Failure Mode, Effects, and Critical Analysis (MIL-STD-1692A). U.S. Department of Defense (1980)
5. NASA: Probabilistic Risk Assessment Procedures Guide for NASA Managers and Practitioners. <http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/codeq/> (2002)
6. Asnar, Y., Giorgini, P., Mylopoulos, J.: Risk Modelling and Reasoning in Goal Models. Technical Report DIT-06-008 (Submitted to RE-2006), DIT - University of Trento (2006)
7. Giorgini, P., Mylopoulos, J., Nicchiarelli, E., Sebastiani, R.: Reasoning with Goal Models. In: ER '02: Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Conceptual Modeling, Springer (2002)
8. Giorgini, P., Mylopoulos, J., Sebastiani, R.: Simple and Minimum-Cost Satisfaction for Goal Models. In: CAiSE '04: In Proceedings International Conference on Advanced Information Systems Engineering. Volume 3084., Springer (2004) 20–33
9. Giorgini, P., Mylopoulos, J., Nicchiarelli, E., Sebastiani, R.: Formal Reasoning Techniques for Goal Models. *Journal of Data Semantics* (2003)
10. van Lamsweerde, A., Letier, E., Darimont, R.: Managing Conflicts in Goal-Driven Requirements Engineering. *IEEE Transaction Software Engineering* **24**(11) (1998) 908–926
11. Carr, M.J., Konda, S.L., Monarch, I., UlrichCarr1993, F.C.: Taxonomy-Based Risk Identification. Technical Report CMU/SEI-93-TR-6, ESC-TR-93-183, Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University (1993)
12. Holton, G.A.: Defining Risk. *Financial Analyst Journal* **60**(6) (2004) 1925
13. Fuxman, A., Kazhamiakin, R., Pistore, M., Roveri, M.: Formal Tropos: language and semantics. [http://trinity.dit.unitn.it/~tropos/papers\\_files/ftsem03.pdf](http://trinity.dit.unitn.it/~tropos/papers_files/ftsem03.pdf) (2003)